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Abstract 
 
Is K-12 public education being disrupted?  
An exploration of the theory of disruptive innovation and online 
learning 
 
Austin Jackson Reilly, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor: Joan E. Hughes 
 
In 2008, Christensen, Horn, and Johnson (2008) predicted that by 2019, 50% of 
high school courses would be online. This paper assesses the progress from 2008 until 
2017 toward that prediction. In order to make that assessment, I provide an overview of 
the current state of online learning and describe the ways in which it has grown since 
2008. Then I describe Christensen et al.’s (2008) theory of disruptive innovation, how 
Christensen et al. (2008) believe their theory explains the history of education reform in 
the United States, and why Christensen et al. (2008) believe the theory of disruptive 
innovation justifies their aforementioned prediction regarding the proliferation of online 
learning. Finally, I discuss the implications of the outcome of the prediction for the 
theory of disruptive innovation and the role the theory has for forward-thinking 
researchers and educators involved in online learning. 
 iv 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................... vi	
List of Figures ....................................................................................................... vii	
Introduction ..............................................................................................................1	
State of Online Learning in the United States .........................................................3	
Defining online learning .................................................................................3	
Dimensions and types of online learning programs ........................................4	
Costs associated with online learning .............................................................8	
Growth of online learning from 2007-2015 ..................................................10	
Overall growth in online learning activity ...........................................11	
Growth in state virtual schools ............................................................14	
Growth in full-time online learning programs .....................................16	
The Prediction and the Theory of Disruptive Innovation ......................................18	
The theory of disruptive innovation ..............................................................19	
Sustaining innovations .........................................................................19	
Disruptive innovations .........................................................................20	
Cramming ............................................................................................20	
The purpose of the theory ....................................................................21	
Disruptive innovation and the history of education reform in the United States
..............................................................................................................22	
Sources of disruption in the private sector ...........................................23	
Capacity for schools to change ............................................................24	
Disruptive innovation and the present and future of education practice ......27	
Why schools have struggled to improve ..............................................27	
Interdependencies and standardization in schools ...............................28	
Student-centered learning ....................................................................30	
Computer-based learning and disrupting K-12 education ............................31	
Defining computer-based learning .......................................................31	
 v 
Why computer-based learning has yet to disrupt education ................32	
Nonconsumption in education .............................................................33	
What the disruption process would look like .......................................35	
Assessing the Prediction ........................................................................................38	
Expectations for growth of online learning ..................................................38	
How online learning grew from 2007-2015 ..................................................39	
Evidence of nonconsumption and online learning ...............................42	
Evidence of a shift in the performance improvement metric ...............43	
Outcome of the prediction ............................................................................44	
Why the Prediction Failed .....................................................................................48	
The K-12 school system is not a free market ................................................48	
Complicated vs. complex systems ................................................................51	
Conclusion .............................................................................................................55	
References ..............................................................................................................58	
  
 vi 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Overall growth in online learning courses, 2005-2012 ...........................13	
 
  
 vii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Growth in state virtual schools, 2007-2015 ............................................16	
Figure 2: Growth in full-time online programs, 2008-2015 ..................................17	
Figure 3: Projected growth of high school courses delivered online, 2000-2020 .35	
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
In the early 1980s, there was growing enthusiasm for using computers for 
instructional purposes. Experts predicted that computers would have a substantial impact 
on instructional practices. For example, Papert (1984) wrote that computers were going to 
be “a catalyst of very deep and radical change in the educational system,” and that by 
1990, it would be common for each student have her own computer in school (p. 422). As 
it turned out, “[a]lthough computers may eventually have a major impact on instructional 
practices in schools, by the mid-1990s that impact had been rather small” (Resier, 2001, 
p. 59). The history of educational technology is rife with predictions that turned out to be 
misguided, to such a degree that a pattern has emerged: “[a]s a new medium enters the 
educational scene, there is a great deal of initial interest and much enthusiasm about the 
effects it is likely to have on instructional practices” (Reiser 2001, p. 60). Eventually, 
however, enthusiasm and interest dissipate, and in retrospect, the medium in question 
turns out to have little to no impact on instructional practices (Reiser, 2001, p. 60). 
Online learning has followed this pattern. As Internet access became more 
ubiquitous in the mid-1990s, there was a great deal of interest and enthusiasm with 
respect to the instructional possibilities the Internet afforded. Owston (1997) captured this 
attitude when he wrote: 
[n]othing before has captured the imagination and interest of educators 
simultaneously around the globe more than the World Wide Web. The Web is 
now causing educators, from preschool to graduate school, to rethink the very 
nature of teaching, learning, and schooling. (p. 27) 
In 2008, this enthusiasm had yet to subside. In their book, Disrupting Class: How 
Disruptive Innovation Will Change the Way the World Learns, Christensen, Horn, and 
Johnson (2008) predicted that that by 2019, “about 50 percent of high school courses will 
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be delivered online” (p. 98). This was an astounding claim to make, given that at the 
time, Picciano and Seaman (2009) estimated that out of 15,086,000 secondary public 
school students nationwide, only 721,000 (4%) were enrolled in at least one online or 
blended course during the 2007-2008 school year (Picciano & Seaman, 2009, p. 11; 
Snyder, de Brey, & Dillow, 2016, p. 60). The comparison between Christensen et al.’s 
(2008) prediction and Picciano and Seaman’s (2009) estimate is admittedly tenuous since 
Christensen et al.’s (2008) prediction was given in terms of the percentage of courses 
taught and Picciano and Seaman’s (2009) estimate was made in terms of the number of 
students enrolled in at least one online course. However, the number of students enrolled 
in an online course does give some insight into the percentage of overall courses that are 
delivered online. Picciano and Seaman’s (2009) estimate that just 4% of all students were 
enrolled in at least one online course implies that no more than 4% of all classes was 
being delivered online. So, if Christensen et al.’s (2008) prediction that 50% of all classes 
would be delivered online proved accurate, the percentage of students enrolled in at least 
one online class would have to be much higher since students take six courses or more. In 
other words, Christensen et al. (2008) were predicting exponential and transformational 
growth in online learning in a relatively short timeframe. 
In this paper, I explore, assess, and analyze Christensen et al.’s (2008) prediction. 
To do so, I first describe the current known state of online learning in 2017. Then, I 
explain how and why Christensen et al. (2008) came to believe that 50% of high school 
courses would be delivered online in 2019, using their argument in Disrupting Class. 
Finally, I consider the underlying assumptions and implications of that argument. 
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State of Online Learning in the United States 
In this section, I begin by defining a set of terms regarding the topic of online 
learning in the United States. Next, I examine the different ways in which online learning 
can be classified, followed by identifying the three kinds of online learning programs 
most relevant for this paper. Then, I give an overview of the costs associated with online 
learning. Finally, I provide data that shows the ways in which online learning has 
expanded since 2005. 
DEFINING ONLINE LEARNING 
As defined by the International Association for K-12 Online Learning (INACOL), 
online learning is “[e]ducation in which instruction and content are delivered primarily 
over the Internet” (International Association for K-12 Online Learning 2011, p. 7). 
Online learning is a more specific form of distance education, which is the “[g]eneral 
term for any type of educational activity in which the participants are at a distance from 
each other—in other words, are separated in space” (International Association for K-12 
Online Learning, 2011, p. 5). Distance education, and thus online learning, can be either 
synchronous (i.e., teachers and students simultaneously interact with each other) or 
asynchronous (i.e., teachers and students do not interact with each other at the same 
time). Early formulations of distance education were intended for homeschooled students 
and included delivery methods such as “print materials, CD-ROMS, and video 
conferencing to deliver instruction and facilitate communication” (Gemin, Pape, Vashaw, 
& Watson, 2015, p. 11). Initially, online learning initiatives attempted to combine 
traditional classroom practices, such as the teacher being the primary source of 
instruction, with distance learning concepts, like asynchronous interactions (Gemin et al., 
2015, p. 11). For example, a video recording of a teacher would be made, then put online 
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for students to watch whenever and wherever they preferred, independent of the other 
students in the class. In time, practitioners have begun to experiment with the model of 
combining existing teaching practices with distance learning concepts, leading to a 
variety of different use cases and types of online learning. For example, according to 
Wicks (2010), online learning has been “used successfully for a wide variety of 
purposes,” including: 
• expanding the range of courses available to students, especially in small, rural or 
inner-city schools, beyond what a single school can offer; 
• providing highly qualified teachers in subjects where qualified teachers are 
unavailable; 
• providing flexibility to students facing scheduling conflicts; 
• affording opportunities for at-risk students, elite athletes and performers, 
dropouts, migrant youth, pregnant or incarcerated students, and students who are 
homebound due to illness or injury; allowing them to continue their studies 
outside the classroom; 
• providing credit recovery programs for students that have failed courses and/or 
dropped out of school, allowing them to get back on track to graduate; 
• helping students that are currently performing below grade-level to begin 
catching-up through blended learning (p. 10) 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive of the possible use cases of online education. 
Rather, it is intended to demonstrate the heterogeneous manner in which online learning 
has been employed in K-12 schools. 
DIMENSIONS AND TYPES OF ONLINE LEARNING PROGRAMS 
Because of the scope and breadth of the ways in which online learning programs 
are utilized, it is necessary to develop ways of categorizing them. These dimensions 
allow me to describe the various types of learning programs. Each dimension consists of 
at least a few, and sometimes multiple categories. 
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The first dimension I refer to is comprehensiveness of online learning programs, 
which itself has two categories: supplemental and full-time. A supplemental online 
learning program is additional to a separate, full-time, traditional brick-and-mortar school 
program. A high school offering an online Advanced Placement (AP) course they would 
not otherwise be able to offer is an example of a supplemental program. Conversely, 
there are full-time online learning programs such as the Florida Virtual School, through 
which a student, if she so chooses, could complete her entire K-12 education fully online 
(Gemin et al., 2015, p. 15). 
Next, geographic reach is another import dimension of online learning. Online 
learning programs can function within a single school district, across multiple school 
districts, in an entire state, nationally, or even internationally (Wicks, 2010, p. 13). As 
such, online learning programs can have a greater geographic range than traditional 
schools, such as when “a student in California may be learning from a teacher in Illinois 
who is employed by a program in Massachusetts” (Wicks, 2010, p. 13). This can lead to 
outdated polices and complicates the funding with respect to online learning programs, 
because each state has its own set of laws that dictate policies and funding. 
Type of instruction is another dimension of online learning programs, and is a 
way of categorizing the source of instruction. Instruction could be delivered entirely 
online, entirely face-to-face, or some combination of the two. The type of instruction in 
the traditional classroom model is entirely face-to-face, in that the instruction is delivered 
to students by an instructor while they are in the same place. The online type of 
instruction is characterized by the instruction for a class being delivered via the Internet. 
For example, a series of online videos of a teacher giving lectures would be fully online 
instruction. 
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When instruction incorporates both online and face-to-face sources, it is known as 
blended learning. According to Christensen, Horn, and Staker (2013), there are four 
models that describe how blended learning can be used. First, there is the Rotation model, 
in which students rotate between several different learning modalities, at least one of 
which is online learning (Christensen et al., 2013, p. 26). For example, in the Rotation 
model, an Algebra 1 teacher could use full-class in-person instruction, small-group in-
person instruction, worksheets, and online instruction such as the Khan Academy while 
teaching a topic. Next, there is the Flex model of blended learning, in which instruction 
for an individual student is primarily online, with some learning activity taking place 
offline (Christensen et al., 2013, p. 26). In the Flex model, students proceed through their 
coursework at their own pace, with support from an onsite instructor. For example, a 
student in a Flex model would watch lectures and complete assessments online, but seek 
assistance from a teacher for a portion of a lesson or a question on a quiz that the student 
does not understand. Third, there is the A La Carte model of blended learning, in which 
students take at least one class entirely online while simultaneously taking classes in a 
traditional school setting (Christensen et al., 2013, p. 26). So, a student in the A La Carte 
model could take an AP United States History course not offered at their school and still 
take other in-person courses along with other students following the traditional model. 
Finally, there is the Enriched Virtual model, where all students “divide their time 
between attending a brick-and-mortar campus and learning remotely using online 
delivery of content and instruction” (Christensen et al., 2013, p. 26). The Rotation and A 
La Carte models of blended learning are the models that are most easily implemented 
alongside the traditional classroom model and thus are more common among schools that 
implement at least one model of blended learning program. The Flex model is often used 
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for credit-recovery coursework, and the Enriched Virtual model is often used by state 
virtual schools or full-time online programs, which I discuss shortly.  
The last two relevant dimensions are location and grade level. Location is a 
dimension that determines where instruction takes place, either in school, at home, or in 
another place. For example, an online learning program could have no physical 
infrastructure, necessitating instruction taking place at a child’s home. Grade level is 
another dimension of online learning programs. Grade level could be any grade level 
within either elementary, middle, or high school. Some online learning programs provide 
instruction for grades K-12, whereas others are intended strictly for high school. 
These dimensions help define the most relevant kinds of online learning 
programs. Next, I highlight the three types of online learning programs that had the 
strongest rates of adoption in 2008, when Christensen et al. (2008) made their prediction. 
First, there are state virtual schools. State virtual schools are schools “created by 
legislation or by a state-level agency, and/or administered by a state education agency, 
and/or funded by a state appropriation or grant for the purpose of providing online 
learning opportunities across the state” (International Association for K-12 Online 
Learning, 2011, p. 5). State virtual schools offer supplemental courses for traditional 
schools on a state-wide level and at all grade levels for the states in which they operate. 
The courses state virtual schools offer could be used for blended learning purposes using 
any of the previously discussed blended learning models.  
Next, there are full-time online programs, which are sometimes called 
cyberschools. Full-time online programs have no physical instructional facilities, and 
teachers and students are usually geographically remote from one another (Gemin et al., 
2015, p. 7). Full-time online programs are comprehensively full-time, and are 
“administered by, and serving, multiple districts, often organized in a formal consortium” 
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(International Association for K-12 Online Learning, 2011, p. 7). They are typically, but 
not always, charter schools (Watson, Murin, Vashaw, Gemin & Rapp, 2013, p. 21). The 
South Carolina Connections Academy (SCCA) is an example of a full-time online charter 
school. SCCA serves the entire state of South Carolina. The instruction for SCCA is 
provided by Connections Academy, a national subsidiary of Pearson Education, an 
instance of a formal consortium (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 39). 
Finally, there are single-district online programs that are “created by a district 
primarily for students within that district” (Watson et al., 2013, p. 17). Single-district 
online programs can be fully online, but more often they supply supplemental online 
courses for students within a district. Most districts utilize content from a state virtual 
school or private providers (Watson et al., 2013, p. 17). Because students within a single-
district online program necessarily live in close geographical proximity to one another, 
single-district online programs can, and increasingly do, implement some kind of blended 
learning program (Watson, Murin, Vashaw, Gemin & Rapp, 2011, p. 4). Although as of 
2013 more than 75% of districts have some option for students to take an online or 
blended course, there are only a small minority of students actually enrolling in courses, 
typically for reasons such as credit recovery or dual credit (Watson et al., 2013, p. 17). 
Larger districts tend to have more comprehensive online and blended offerings for a 
larger portion of their students (Watson et al., 2013, p. 18). For example, the city of 
Nashville created the Metro Nashville Public School through which students can enroll in 
supplemental online core, elective, and AP courses (Watson et al., 2013, p. 18). 
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ONLINE LEARNING 
Because of the plethora of ways in which online learning is used and directions in 
which it is growing, determining 
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Different kinds of online learning programs have different costs associated with them. 
For example, full-time online programs must comply with administering state 
assessments, whereas supplemental programs do not. Full-time online instruction 
intuitively seems like it could be less expensive than face-to-face instruction due to cost 
savings from not having to maintain a physical school building. But this is not necessarily 
so, because potential savings could potentially be offset by a number of factors, including 
“the need for hardware, software, and connectivity for classes, ongoing technical support, 
comprehensive student support, course development or licensing, and other costs, 
especially during program start-up” (Wicks 2010, p. 14-15). The costs of an online 
program depend on “the quality of a program, quality of teaching, quality of content, as 
well as the context and instructional design,” all of which have a high degree of variance 
from program to program (Patrick, Myers, Silverstein, Brown, & Watson, 2015, p. 28). 
There are significant cost differences between levels of comprehensiveness found 
in online programs, full-time and supplemental. After adjusting for factors such as 
student-teacher ratios, student support services, administrative needs, and technology 
needs, a recent INACOL report estimated that “the cost of the full-time online school 
(that is resourced to bring all students to college- and career-ready success) is between 
93% and 98% of a traditional school cost” (Patrick et al., 2015, p. 27). In short, according 
to Patrick et al. (2015), full-time online learning programs appear to be slightly less 
expensive than their traditional counterparts overall. 
By contrast, supplemental courses are considerably less expensive. The cost of a 
single online course as part of a supplemental program is “roughly 7%” of the cost of a 
full-time online learning program, “assuming a student takes a full load of six courses per 
semester, with 12 courses annually” (Patrick et al., 2015, p. 28). Costs for supplemental 
programs are less expensive in part because there are reduced expenses for administrative 
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overhead, which are covered by the “home” district of the student (Patrick et al., 2015, p. 
28). 
A cost-related benefit of online learning programs that is difficult to account for is 
that online programs make courses available to students who otherwise would not have 
access. Traditional schools cannot financially justify offering a course if there is not 
sufficient demand, such as a minimum enrollment of students, for it. Online learning 
unites unmet student demand for courses because geography is no longer a limitation for 
online courses. As a result, it can be cost-effective for an online learning program to offer 
supplemental course in, to cite a classic example, Mandarin Chinese, because it can 
accumulate enough students from across a large geographic range to make the course 
cost-effective (Wicks, 2010, p. 13). 
GROWTH OF ONLINE LEARNING FROM 2007-2015 
In 2010, Wicks commented that online learning was growing so quickly that 
“publications that include specific statistics and data are at risk of being out-of-date 
before they are published” (p. 13). At the advent of significant online learning activity, 
around 2004, online learning consisted of a few well-defined categories, as Watson and 
Murin (2014) explained, “there were state virtual schools and fully online charter schools, 
but there was essentially no blended learning and very little district-level activity” (p. 2). 
This relatively simple context has become more complex since then, as “nearly every 
aspect of the online and blended landscape has become more complex, more 
interconnected and more volatile” (Watson & Murin, 2014, p. 3). This context was 
facilitated in part by technological innovations that have been adopted for use in 
classrooms since 2008. Technological innovations such as smartphones, tablet computers, 
inexpensive “thin client” laptop computers, and cloud computing have created the 
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conditions for profoundly altering the traditional classroom experience, enabling students 
to learn in ways that were previously not possible.  
Overall growth in online learning activity 
The definitive dataset available regarding national growth in enrollments in online 
learning programs is from two surveys conducted by Picciano and Seaman in 2006 and 
2008, respectively. Both surveys collected data directly from hundreds of randomly 
selected public school districts. The first survey reported on the 2005-2006 academic 
year. In this survey, 57.9% of the school districts that responded had at least one student 
enrolled in an online course during the 2005-2006 school year; 32.4% of responding 
districts had at least one student enrolled in a blended course during the same time period 
(Picciano & Seaman, 2007, p. 7). Overall, 63.1% of reporting school districts had 
students taking either online or blended courses, and 20.7% stated they planned on 
introducing that option in the next three years. Based on these percentages, Picciano and 
Seaman (2007) estimated that “approximately 700,000 students (1.5%) of the entire 
population of 48,000,000 public school students were enrolled in online and blended 
learning courses” (Picciano & Seaman, 2007, p. 9). 
In the follow-up survey they conducted in 2007, Picciano and Seaman (2009) 
found increases in enrollment numbers for both online and blended learning. For the 
2007-2008 survey, Picciano and Seaman (2009) found that 69.8% of reporting school 
districts had at least one student enrolled in an online course, and 41% of districts 
reporting had at least one student enrolled in a blended course (p. 9). A total of 74.8% of 
school districts in the survey had at least one student enrolled in either an online or 
blended course and the remaining 15% were planning on introducing online or blended 
courses to their districts within the next three years (Picciano & Seaman, 2009, p. 9). This 
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data made it clear that in 2007, “the vast majority of American school districts [were] 
providing some form of online learning for their students and more plan to do so within 
the next three years” (Picciano & Seaman, 2009, p. 9). Picciano and Seaman (2009) 
extrapolated the survey data they collected to calculate that “approximately 1,030,000 
(2.1%) students for the entire population of 49,000,000 public school students were 
enrolled in online and blended learning courses in the 2007-2008 academic year,” a 47% 
increase in just two years (p. 11). Altogether, the 2009 version of Picciano and Seaman’s 
survey confirmed their original findings: enrollments in online and blended learning were 
growing and were showing no signs of slowing down (Picciano & Seaman, 2009, p. 26).  
Unfortunately, Picciano and Seaman have yet to conduct a follow up survey, so 
other, less scientific measurements offer more current data. INACOL estimated that 1.5 
million K-12 students were enrolled in online and blended courses during the 2009-2010 
school year (Wicks, 2010, p. 14). The available data regarding overall growth in online 
learning is summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Overall growth in online learning courses, 2005-2012 
 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 
Total students  48,000,000 49,000,000 49,361,000 49,522,000 
Number of 
students 
enrolled in an 
online course 
700,000 1,030,000 1,500,000 2,476,100 
Percentage of 
total students 
enrolled in an 
online course 
1.46% 2.10% 3.04% 5% 
Data for 2005-2006 and 2007-2008 from Picciano & Seaman (2007) and Picciano & 
Seaman (2009). Data for 2009-2010 from Wicks (2010). Data for 2011-2012 from 
Watson et al. (2012). 
Beyond this INACOL report, the most useful information about the growth of online 
learning comes from the “Keeping Pace with K-12 Online Learning Reports.” Since 
2004, the “Keeping Pace” report has been published annually to document the latest 
trends, policies, and practices in the United States regarding digital learning. The 
“Keeping Pace” reports have three goals. First, the series of reports attempts to “add to 
the body of knowledge about online education policy and practice, and make 
recommendations for advances” (“About Keeping Pace,” n.d.). Second, the series serves 
“as a reference source for information about programs and policies across the country, 
both for policymakers and practitioners who are new to online education, and for those 
who have extensive experience in the field” (“About Keeping Pace,” n.d.). Finally, the 
series tries to capture new activity from the past year in the online learning scene (“About 
Keeping Pace,” n.d.). So, the “Keeping Pace” reports are a good source of data from 
which to capture snapshots of the state of digital learning during the particular year in 
which it was published. 
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In the 2012 edition of the “Keeping Pace” reports, the authors wrote that “[t]he 
total number of students taking part in [online learning programs] is unknown, but is 
likely several million, or slightly more than 5% of the total K-12 student population 
across the United States” (Watson, Murin, Vashaw, Gemin & Rapp, 2012, p. 5). The 
National Center for Education Statistics data from the 2011-2012 school year indicates 
that there were 49,522,000 students enrolled in both public and private elementary and 
secondary schools (Snyder et al., 2016, p. 60). So, based on these two numbers, and in 
order to have a rough comparison between this and previously stated calculations, the 
2012 “Keeping Pace” report estimated that 2,476,100 students were enrolled in at least 
one online or blended learning course. Notably, Watson et al. (2012) emphasized that 
their reported numbers were computed “by triangulating from close to a dozen sources” 
and moreover that “[n]o single source is comprehensive” (p. 5). This qualification is a 
reflection of the growing difficulty in tracking online and blended learning at this time. 
After 2012, these comprehensive estimates about online and blended learning were not 
available. In the 2013 “Keeping Pace” report, Watson et al. (2013) wrote that their 2012 
estimate of 5% of the total K-12 student population continued to grow “steadily, although 
not explosively” (p. 17). The general trend of steady, but not explosive growth is 
reflected in the levels of growth for state virtual and full-time online schools. 
Growth in state virtual schools 
In 2007, state virtual schools were expanding rapidly, both in terms of the number 
of states who funded them and the number of students who were enrolled in courses 
offered by state virtual schools.  From 2007 until 2015, the “Keeping Pace” reports 
tracked the number of states with state virtual school and estimated the number of 
students enrolled at those schools. This data is summarized in Figure 1. At their peak rate 
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of growth in the 2009-2010 school year, state virtual schools were operating in 31 states 
and had 450,000 course enrollments (Watson, Murin, Vashaw, Gemin & Rapp, 2010, p. 
21). Since then, although the total number of enrollments has grown, this growth is 
concentrated in the largest state virtual schools, such as Florida and North Carolina. On 
the whole, there are two reasons why state virtual schools became less relevant as time 
went on. First, in most states, individual districts, various consortia, and private course 
content providers are providing an increasing share of supplemental online courses 
(Watson et al., 2012, p. 29). Second, many virtual schools were underfunded or defunded 
(Watson et al., 2012, p. 29). Notably, one of the fastest growing services that state virtual 
schools provide is supporting blended learning programs that use the A La Carte and 
Enriched Virtual models (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 81). In 2015, there were 24 states with 
state virtual schools, enrolling 815,000 students. State virtual schools continue to supply 
some states with supplemental online course content and related services, but their impact 
is limited to the states in which state virtual schools operate (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 70). 
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Figure 1: Growth in state virtual schools, 2007-2015 
 
Data from “Keeping Pace” Reports, 2007-2015 
Growth in full-time online learning programs 
Full-time online programs share a similar arc of growth with state virtual schools. 
Total enrollment for full-time online courses has trended upwards, but growth has slowed 
in recent years. The number of states that allowed students to enroll in full-time online 
programs, along with estimated enrollment numbers as reported in the “Keeping Pace” 
reports from 2008 to 2015 is displayed in Figure 2. In the 2012 school year, 31 states 
allowed students to enroll in full-time online programs, but as shown in Figure 2, this 
number has fallen to 25 for the 2014-2015 school year (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 39; Watson 
et al., 2011, p. 6). This is due in part to some states restricting by law the “total number of 
schools, students, or out-of-district students who may be served” by full-time online 
programs (Watson & Murin, 2014, p. 9). Other reasons for the dwindling growth of full-
time online learning are related to the belief that “face-to-face socialization is a key 
component of student maturation” and also because “many parents are unable to serve as 
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a learning coach for their children in the home,” which full-time online programs demand 
(Gemin et al., 2015, p. 40). According to Gemin et al. (2015), students are increasingly 
likely to select district-level online course offerings as such offerings have increased and 
diversified (p. 40). 
Figure 2: Growth in full-time online programs, 2008-2015 
 
Data from “Keeping Pace” Reports, 2008-2015 
Overall, the data regarding growth in online learning indicates steady, but not 
exponential growth from 2007-2015. Before analyzing this growth further, I turn to the 
justification Christensen et al. (2008) presented for their prediction in Disrupting Class. 
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The Prediction and the Theory of Disruptive Innovation 
Christensen et al. (2008) predicted that by 2019, “about 50 percent of high school 
courses will be delivered online” (p. 98). In Disrupting Class, Christensen et al. (2008) 
admit that such a shift would be “breathtaking” (p. 102). Other critics also recognized the 
audacity of the prediction. Glazer (2008) wrote that “[t]his is an astonishing projection, 
and one doesn’t know what to make of it. Is it really possible?” (p. 79). Martone (2015) 
felt the prediction seemed “too lofty” (p. 144). Zucker (2008) reported that “[m]any 
experts, including experienced leaders of online schools and others who have studied 
them for years, find this claim unbelievable” (p. 3). Watson, Gemin, and Ryan (2008) 
characterized the prediction as “startling” (p. 44). Finally, Frost (2011) wrote that “[i]t’s a 
prediction that evokes thoughtful, varied, and often passionate reactions, especially from 
those of us that work in education and education technology” (para. 2). When 
Christensen et al. (2008) made their prediction, just 4.8% of public high school students 
were enrolled in at least one online or blended course, yet in just over 10 years, 
Christensen et al. (2008) thought that half of all the courses high school students take 
would be delivered online. This drastic increase is in part why members of the education 
technology community had such a strong reaction to Christensen et al.’s (2008) 
prediction. 
Later in the paper, I assess whether or not Christensen et al.’s (2008) prediction is 
coming to fruition. But first, I examine how Christensen et al. (2008) arrived at their 
controversial prediction. I begin by providing an overview of the theory of disruptive 
innovation. Then I explore how Christensen et al. (2008) applied the theory of disruptive 
innovation to education in the United States in Disrupting Class. 
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THE THEORY OF DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
The theory of disruptive innovation is an attempt to account for the ways in which 
private sector markets react to innovations over time (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 45). 
According to the theory, any industry can be described by looking at what Christensen et 
al. (2008) call the plane of competition. The plane of competition is a measure of 
performance and time. Customers in a market decide whether or not to purchase a 
product based on whether or not that product meets their needs at that time. As time goes 
on, private sector firms tend to make improvements to their products based on what those 
firms perceive to be their customers’ current and future needs. The rate at which firms 
improve their products is called the performance improvement trajectory. Customers are 
willing to pay more in exchange for higher performance. 
Sustaining innovations 
An improvement to a product that is made to appeal to existing customers’ current 
or future needs is called a sustaining innovation because it sustains the existing 
performance improvement trajectory. Private sector firms that are in a market leading 
position are incentivized to make sustaining innovations to their products because 
sustaining innovations justify charging existing customers higher prices, leading to higher 
profits. But continuously adding features to a product has a hidden cost, namely an 
increasingly complicated and expensive product. So, as a result of private sector firms 
making the economically rational decision to seek profits, their products eventually 
become costly and complex, which influences the kinds of consumers who would like 
and are able to purchase them. To use expensive and complicated products, consumers 
must have both money and expertise. This set of circumstances creates an entry point for 
a different kind of innovation. 
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Disruptive innovations 
A disruptive innovation is a kind of innovation that results in a new plane of 
competition and thus, a distinct performance improvement trajectory from the one being 
used in the previous plane of competition. In other words, it disrupts the previous plane 
of competition by creating a new measure of performance. A disruptive innovation has a 
few telling characteristics and consequences for an industry. First, products that are 
representative of a disruptive innovation are not as good as products that were brought to 
market as a result of the incentive structure in the previous plane of competition. 
Disruptively innovative products tend to be cheaper and simpler than products that have 
matured as a result of sustaining innovations. As a result, disruptively innovative 
products do not appeal to customers in the previous plane of competition, and therefore 
are ignored by private sector firms in the previous plane. In other words, disruptively 
innovative products do not seem to threaten the profits of the firms competing in the 
previous plane of competition. However, this also means that disruptively innovative 
products do appeal to a new set of customers who were “nonconsumers” of the previous 
product, who are willing to accept the tradeoff of fewer features for a lower price point. 
The concept of nonconsumers has a critical role to play in the framework of the theory of 
disruptive innovation. 
Cramming 
Private sector firms have struggled to simultaneously compete in more than one 
plane of competition because their motivations for making sustaining innovations, which 
have allowed them to obtain and maintain their current market position, are antithetical to 
the kinds of improvements they would need to make to their product in order to compete 
with the disruptively innovative product. Instead, private sector firms tend to mold 
innovative ideas to “fit the interests of the groups in the company that must support the 
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proposal in order for it to receive funding” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 75). So, 
potentially disruptive innovations are refashioned into sustaining innovations by the firms 
who are successful in the original plane of competition. In the parlance of disruptive 
innovation theory, this tendency is known as cramming. As a result of the tendency of 
successful firms to cram potentially disruptive innovations, disruptive innovations almost 
always come from new entrants to a market. 
Eventually, the private sector firms that brought the disruptively innovative 
product to market improves the product through a series of sustaining innovations. Those 
firms continue to sustainably improve their product until users are able to substitute the 
new, disruptive product for the old product for the same task without sacrificing any 
significant functionality. This new product overtakes the products competing in the 
previous plane of competition because they are able to perform the same tasks for a lower 
cost. 
To summarize, the essential characteristics of a disruptive innovation are: 
• it creates a new measure of performance and thus a new plane of competition 
• it appeals to nonconsumers of the previous plane of competition 
• it tends to result in products that are relatively simpler and cheaper 
Next, I discuss the rationale for using the theory of disruptive innovation as a tool for 
analysis. 
The purpose of the theory 
The theory of disruptive innovation is intended to serve two purposes. As Lepore 
(2014) explained in her essay criticizing the theory of disruptive innovation, the theory is 
“meant to serve both as a chronicle of the past (this has happened) and as a model for the 
future (it will keep happening)” (para. 13). In other words, the theory was conceived with 
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the expectation that it could be used to understand past trends in a given marketplace and 
to provide a framework with which to forecast future trends.  This comports with the 
ways in which Christensen et al. (2008) used the theory of disruptive innovation in 
Disrupting Class. In the acknowledgements of Disrupting Class, Christensen himself 
wrote that “…disruption—a powerful body of theory that describes how people interact 
and react, how behavior is shaped, how organizational cultures form and influence 
decisions—can usefully frame why our schools have struggled to improve and how to 
solve these problems” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. v). So, I use these two purposes of the 
theory of disruptive innovation to explain why Christensen et al. (2008) made their 
ambitious prediction. 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION AND THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION REFORM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
In Disrupting Class, Christensen et al. (2008) used the theory of disruptive 
innovation to account for the ways in which the public school system has changed over 
time. It seems dubious that the theory of disruptive innovation would translate to the 
public sector, since it seems to depend on private sector mechanisms such as profit 
seeking. However, Christensen et al. (2008) argued that their model still applied to the 
public sector, with one simple adjustment. Rather than the plane of competition 
consisting of a measure of performance and time as in the private sector, the plane of 
competition for the public sector consists of the political or societal importance of a 
program and time (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 51). So, for the public sector, the 
performance improvement metric could actually be called the political importance metric. 
And, akin to the behavior of firms in private sector, public agencies make “sustaining 
innovations” in the form of policy decisions that conform to the current political 
importance metric until society disrupts the public agency by changing what they deem to 
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be politically important, at which point a new political importance metric is created in a 
new plane of competition. 
Sources of disruption in the private sector 
One outstanding difference between the public and private sectors as it relates to 
disruptive innovation is the source of disruption. In the private sector, an innovation 
becomes disruptive when it is brought to market in a new product that appeals to 
consumers who were interested in the features of an existing product, but found the 
existing product too complicated, expensive or both. As a reminder, these kinds of 
consumers are called nonconsumers. Generally, new entrants to a market disruptively 
deploy products to nonconsumers. In the public sector, according to Christensen et al. 
(2008), society is the source of disruption by “mov[ing] the goal posts on schools and 
impos[ing] upon them new measures of performance” (p. 51). Furthermore, public 
education is set up as a virtual monopoly in the United States, so it is impossible for new 
organizations with different business models to disrupt school districts. As a result, 
school districts have had to “negotiate… disruptive redefinition of performance entirely 
within their existing schools” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 61). This is particularly 
remarkable given that in all the research Christensen et al. (2008) had conducted, they 
“are not aware of a single instance in which a for-profit company was able to implement 
successfully the disruptive innovation within its core business…” (p. 61). So, by 
redefining the performance improvement metric as the political importance metric, 
Christensen et al. (2008) believed that the theory of disruptive innovation could apply to 
the public sector in general, and the public school system specifically. 
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Capacity for schools to change 
Christensen et al. (2008) contended that there have been four disruptive shifts of 
the political importance metric for public education since the United States was founded 
in 1776. According to Christensen et al. (2008), these four shifts accounted for the major 
landmarks in the history of education reform in the United States. These shifts also 
demonstrate the capability of the school system to make itself over in response to 
disruptive changes in the political importance metric. 
When the United States was founded, most children did not attend school. In the 
language of the theory of disruptive innovation, there was a great deal of nonconsumption 
of education in the late 18th and early to mid-19th century. The first shift of the political 
importance metric dealt with preserving the newly founded democracy and inculcating 
democratic values (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 52). Important political figures in this time 
period, such as Thomas Jefferson and Noah Webster, believed schools had a role to play 
in preserving the newly founded democracy. To do this job, a formal school system was 
established over time and elementary education swiftly expanded. Most schools were 
one-room schoolhouses, and only a small subset of students continued to be educated 
beyond grade school (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 53). 
Then, in the 1890s and early 1900s, Christensen et al. (2008) wrote that 
“competition with a fast-rising industrial Germany constituted a minicrisis…” (p. 53). In 
response to this “minicrisis,” Americans shifted the political importance metric from 
preparing students to lead and participate in democracy to providing more students with 
an education to prepare them to enter the workforce by increasing the breadth and depth 
of offerings. This movement qualifies as a disruptive shift in Christensen et al.’s (2008) 
framework. School systems began to respond to this disruptive shift by enacting policies 
that extended high school to more students. At that time, school attendance was not 
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compulsory, so there was a great deal of nonconsumption of education, especially in high 
school. At the beginning of the 20th century, “only a third of children who enrolled in 
grade 1 made it to high school” and of those students, “roughly a third of those 
graduated” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 54). But by 1930, over 75% of students entered 
high school, and about 45 percent graduated (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 54). At first, 
high schools offered a relatively narrow curriculum, including subjects like Latin or 
Greek, because those were the courses the students who were still attending high school 
would have needed to prepare for college. But, as the number of students attending high 
school increased, and the role of high schools changed, high schools made the sustaining 
innovation to offer music, art, physical education, and vocational classes, such as shop 
work.  
There were two significant shocks to the education system as time went on, but 
both resulted in sustaining innovations, because the political importance metric remained 
in place. First, Brown v. Board of Education ordered the desegregation of schools. This 
expanded the definition of what “everyone” meant in the existing formulation of the 
political importance metric (providing more students with an education to prepare them 
to enter the workforce by increasing the breadth and depth of offerings). The second 
shock to the education system was the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in 1958. 
Christensen et al. (2008) argued that the public’s response to this shock was a demand for 
“more rigorous science and math courses,” and schools responded by offering more 
courses and lab equipment over the next decade (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 56). In other 
words, the school system continued to make sustaining innovations along the existing 
political importance metric of expanding the breadth and depth of offerings to students.  
Sustaining innovations that expanded the breadth and depth of offerings continued 
until around 1970, when Americans began to think that their school system was being 
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outperformed by school systems in other countries because of the results of nationally 
administered standardized tests (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 58). The American people’s 
angst about this situation was exacerbated in the mid-1970s when the College Board 
revealed that average SAT scores had been declining since 1963 (Christensen et al., 2008, 
p. 58). Consequently, the political importance metric shifted again to improvement in 
average test scores. As evidence of this shift in the political importance metric, 
Christensen et al. (2008) cited the “A Nation at Risk” report, issued in 1983. According 
to Christensen et al. (2008), the report “did take note of schools’ unparalleled breadth of 
courses, services, and access, but [the repot] was less sure this was a good thing” (p. 59). 
The “A Nation at Risk” report wrote that “[s]econdary school curricula have been 
homogenized, diluted, and diffused to the point that they no longer have a central 
purpose. In effect, we have a cafeteria style curriculum in which the appetizers and 
desserts can easily be mistaken for the main courses" (National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, 1983, para. 2). As evidence of the shortcomings of the current 
curriculum, “A Nation at Risk” gave “several accounts of U.S. students’ subpar 
performance on output measures, such as test scores” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 59). At 
the state level, laws were passed to put the new political importance metric into practice 
and as a result, “[m]ore standardized tests were implemented, and students, teachers, and 
schools were held accountable for test-score performance” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 
60). Again, the school system produced remarkable results. National Assessment of 
Education Progress scores in math and reading have trended positively since the early 
1980s (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 60). 
According to Christensen et al. (2008), as a consequence of passing the No Child 
Left Behind Act in 2001, the federal government assured that standardized tests would 
continue to be “the primary metric for performance improvement” in schools (p. 62). 
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However, the No Child Left Behind Act arguably shifted the political importance metric 
because the law mandated that “public schools must see to it that every child in every 
demographic improves his or her test scores,” as opposed to the previous political 
importance metric, average standardized test scores. Christensen et al. (2008) contended 
that this is a disruptive shift because the motivation behind requiring every student to be 
proficient in core subjects is “to eliminate poverty” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 62-63). 
In presenting this overview of the history of public education in the United States 
from the perspective of disruptive innovation, Christensen et al. (2008) sought to provide 
evidence that “in the face of enormous hurdles and despite changing demands on schools, 
teachers and administrators have constantly improved public schools in the United States 
and navigated the disruptions imposed upon them” (p. 65). In other words, schools have 
consistently shown the capacity to adapt to disruptive changes in the political importance 
metric. For Christensen et al. (2008), this is proof that the theory of disruptive innovation 
can be applied to public education.  
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF EDUCATION PRACTICE 
Christensen et al. (2008) believed that the theory of disruptive innovation does not 
just explain the past. The theory can also provide a model to help plan for the future. In 
this section of the paper, I expound on Christensen et al.’s (2008) assessment of the 
present education system in the United States. Then I consider what the theory of 
disruptive innovation suggests to resolve the problems Christensen et al. (2008) identified 
in their analysis.  
Why schools have struggled to improve 
Christensen et al. (2008) had lofty but laudable expectations for schools, as 
summarized at the outset of Disrupting Class: 
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1. Maximize human potential. 
2. Facilitate a vibrant, participative democracy in which we have an informed 
electorate that is capable of not being ‘spun’ by self-interested leaders. 
3. Hone the skills, capabilities, and attitudes that will help our economy remain 
prosperous and economically competitive. 
4. Nurture the understanding that people can see things differently—and that 
those differences merit respect rather than persecution. (p. 1) 
But, Christensen et al. (2008) asserted that “[w]e’re not doing very well in the journey 
toward these aspirations” and that “most of us wish schools were playing a much more 
effective role in our efforts to move society toward goals like these” (p. 1). In other 
words, Christensen et al. (2008) believed that schools were struggling to improve 
themselves. As opposed to the commonly held explanations of why schools have 
struggled to improve, such as “too little money, too few computers, uninterested or 
unprepared students (and parents), a broken teaching paradigm, and strong unions,” 
Christensen et al. (2008) believed there was a more fundamental, root cause: the way 
schools motivated students (p. 5, 7). If students are not properly motivated, they “reject 
the rigor of any learning task and abandon it before achieving success” (Christensen et 
al., 2008 p. 7). Christensen et al. (2008) thought that education “can and should be an 
intrinsically motivating experience,” wherein “the work itself stimulates and compels and 
individual to stay with the task” (p. 9, 7). The best way to intrinsically motivate students 
in Christensen et al.’s (2008) view was to customize the educational experience for each 
student so that the instruction each student receives best matches the way that student 
learns. 
Interdependencies and standardization in schools 
According to Christensen et al. (2008), the school system was averse to 
customizing education on a student-by-student basis because of the interdependent 
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architecture of the structures that comprise the system. Christensen et al. (2008) identified 
four types of interdependencies in the school system (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 33): 
temporal, lateral, physical, and hierarchical. Temporal interdependency means there is a 
defined order in which subjects are taught across the U.S. public school system 
(Christensen et al., 2008, p. 33). Next, there is lateral interdependency, by which 
Christensen et al. (2008) mean the way one topic is taught affects the way other topics are 
taught. For example, Christensen et al. (2008) pointed out that there are “more efficient” 
ways of teaching foreign languages, but they are not taught that way because “you’d have 
to change the way English grammar is taught; and changing the way grammar is taught 
would mandate changes elsewhere in the English curriculum” (p. 33). Then, there is 
physical interdependency, in the layout of school buildings encourages a teacher-based 
instruction and makes other kinds of teaching, such as project-based learning, difficult to 
implement at scale. Finally, there are hierarchical interdependencies. By this, Christensen 
et al. (2008) were referring to the federal, state, and local government laws that turn into 
policies at the state and district levels. As an example, Christensen et al. (2008) pointed 
out that “[c]urriculum and textbook decisions made at school district 
headquarters…circumscribe the ability of teachers to innovate…” (p. 33). These 
interdependencies constituted a school system that has been designed to facilitate 
standardization, from “the way it trains teachers, the way it groups students, the way the 
curriculum is designed, and the way the school buildings are laid out” (Christensen et al., 
2008, p. 37). As a result of these interdependencies, the school system hindered the 
student-based customizations Christensen et al. (2008) contended were necessary to 
intrinsically motivate students. If schools could find a way to intrinsically motivate 
students at scale, the system would eventually be able to realize the goals Christensen et 
al. (2008) outlined at the beginning of Disrupting Class.  
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Student-centered learning 
In order to intrinsically motivate students, Christensen et al. (2008) contended that 
“we must find a way to move toward…a ‘student-centric’ model” of education (p. 38). 
For Christensen et al. (2008), student-centric learning meant that students would learn “in 
ways that match their intelligence types in the places and at the paces they prefer by 
combing content in customized sequences” (Christensen et al., 2008 p. 38-39).  Student-
centric learning is any kind of student learning that can be customized relative to the 
needs of that student. A tutor personalizing instruction to meet the learning needs of an 
individual student is an example of a student-centric learning model. However, student-
centered learning is more commonly thought of as “a computer with software…which 
can tailor itself to a student’s specific type of intelligence or learning style” (Christensen 
et al., 2008, p. 11). If learning were to be customized on a per-student basis, a student’s 
learning would no longer be constrained by temporal, lateral, physical interdependencies, 
and implementing a student-centric model across the school system would entail a 
disruption of the remaining interdependency (hierarchical). 
To expand student-centric learning across the entire education system, 
Christensen et al. (2008) looked to technology, specifically in the form of computer-
based learning. Computer-based learning is an intermediary step between the existing 
monolithic teaching style and the student-centric model for which Christensen et al. 
(2008) were advocating. Christensen et al. (2008) believed that computer-based learning 
was “emerging as a disruptive force and a promising opportunity” and that “[t]he proper 
use of technology as a platform for learning offers a chance to…customize learning” 
(Christensen et al., 2008, p. 38). If the school system was ever going to migrate to a 
system in which student-centric learning is commonplace, Christensen et al. (2008) 
believed that the school system must first integrate computer-based learning, and the 
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school system must do it in a way in keeping with the principles of theory of disruptive 
innovation. Restated, the school system must disruptively deploy computer-based 
learning by exploiting opportunities created by areas of nonconsumption in education. By 
explaining Christensen et al.’s (2008) conception of computer-based learning and how it 
ought to be implemented in public schools, I show why Christensen et al. (2008) were so 
optimistic about the adoption of online courses, and accordingly why Christensen et al. 
(2008) made their prediction. 
COMPUTER-BASED LEARNING AND DISRUPTING K-12 EDUCATION 
To discuss the role of computer-based learning in the disruption process as it 
applies to K-12 public education, I first provide a definition of what exactly computer-
based learning is. Then I explain why computer-based learning has not yet resulted in 
widespread disruption. Finally, I explain how computer-based learning, if properly 
managed, could eventually trigger the student-centered learning disruption for which 
Christensen et al. (2008) have been advocating. 
Defining computer-based learning 
Christensen et al. (2008) did not give an explicit definition of computer-based 
learning, so I must infer one. Christensen et al. (2008) described computer-based learning 
as “proprietary and relatively expensive to develop” and also wrote, “it will be 
monolithic, with respect to students’ types of intelligence and learning styles” (p. 91). 
Based on examples Christensen et al. (2008) used in the context of writing about 
computer-based learning, he seems to be talking about online learning, which is a sub-
type of computer-based learning in which instruction for a course is delivered primarily 
online, as I previously defined it. 
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Why computer-based learning has yet to disrupt education 
By this definition of computer-based learning, schools had access to computer-
based learning since the 1980s onward. Beginning in the 1980s, the school system 
invested “$60 billion in equipping classrooms with computers” (Christensen et al., 2008, 
p. 81). Yet, classrooms look largely the same as they did before the invention of the 
personal computer and there is no evidence that computers have improved learning 
outcomes (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 72, 3). Computers have had “little effect on how 
teachers teach and students learn” and “haven’t brought schools any closer to realizing 
the promising path of building students’ intrinsic motivation through student-centric 
learning” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 72-73). Since schools have had access to computer-
based learning for so long without any measurable improvements in learning outcomes, it 
is somewhat remarkable that Christensen et al. (2008) believed that computer-based 
learning was at all a part of the disruption process. However, the theory of disruptive 
innovation provides an explanation for the lack of results, namely the tendency of 
organizations to cram potentially disruptive technologies into existing practices. In 
Christensen et al.’s (2008) view, schools have “crammed [computers] to sustain and 
marginally improve the way they already teach” (p. 73). To fulfill their promise, 
potentially disruptive technologies “must be applied in applications where the alternative 
is nothing” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 74). In other words, potentially disruptive 
technologies must first be deployed to nonconsumers to realize their disruptive capacity. 
Christensen et al. (2008) go so far as to say that how a product is framed is “far more 
important for the successful implementation of the technology than is the technology 
itself” (p. 74). Christensen et al. (2008) reported that schools “use[d] computers as a tool 
and a topic, not as a primary instructional mechanism that helps students learn in ways 
that are customized to their type of intelligence” (p. 81). Until relatively recently, despite 
 33 
the possible affordances of computer-based learning, teachers were the primary means by 
which instruction is delivered, and when computer-based learning was used, it was to 
“supplement and reinforce the existing teaching model” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 82). 
Computer-based learning has largely not been used by schools in a way that would allow 
for each student to learn in the way that would be best suited for them. Thus, according to 
Christensen et al. (2008)’s argument, teaching practices and student outcomes have 
remained static. 
Nonconsumption in education 
In 2008, when Disrupting Class was published, not every school was cramming 
computer-based learning. In fact, Christensen et al. (2008) wrote that “if you know where 
to look—competing against nonconsumption—computer-based learning is methodically 
gaining ground as students, educators, and families find it to be better than the 
alternative—having nothing at all” (p. 90). This seems somewhat nonsensical because, 
due to compulsory education laws that have been in effect for over a century, there was a 
trivial level of nonconsumption of education in the United States. But Christensen et al. 
(2008) envisaged several instances of nonconsumption from which disruption could take 
hold: 
Advanced Placement…and other specialized courses; small, rural, and urban 
schools that are unable to offer breadth; ‘credit recovery’ for students who must 
retake courses in order to graduate; home-schooled students and those who can’t 
keep up with the schedule of regular school; students needing special tutoring, 
and prekindergarteners. (p. 91) 
All of these examples were cases in which some students were being underserved by the 
existing system. For instance, if a student would have liked to have taken an AP Calculus 
course, but her school did not have a certified AP instructor, the student would have had 
to wait until college. Deploying against nonconsumption means offering students like the 
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one in the example opportunities for learning that the student would not otherwise have 
had. If school administrators would “change course” and take actions like 
“implement[ing] computer-based learning in places and for courses where there are no 
teachers to teach,” then administrators would be avoiding the cramming problem and at 
the same time disrupting current teaching practices (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 73). 
Schools, in Christensen et al.’s (2008) estimation, ought to treat instances of 
nonconsumption as “opportunities to implement a long-range plan to shift the 
instructional job to student-centric technology step by step and course by course” (p. 
103).  
One reason Christensen et al. (2008) were so confident in their prediction is the 
conclusions drawn from previous research on disruption. According to Christensen et al. 
(2008), disruptions have always followed the same path, from competing against 
nonconsumption in a new plane of competition until the disruptive technology becomes 
good enough to appeal to consumers of the products still competing in the original plane 
of competition, at which point the old customers begin switching from the old product to 
the new one. This evolution is a process, and not a singular event; instead it occurs 
gradually. According to Christensen et al. (2008), this evolution would happen at a 
predictable rate, in the shape of an S-curve: “the initial pace is slow; then it steepens 
dramatically; and finally, it asymptotically approaches 100 percent of the market” (p. 96). 
Moreover, Christensen et al. (2008) argued that, based on previous examples of 
disruption, there was a formula (called a “substitution curve”) for predicting when a 
disruption is occurring based on the ratio of new “market shares” of a product divided by 
the old (p. 97). In Disrupting Class, Christensen et al. (2008) asserted that from the 
available data, “about 50 percent of high school courses will be delivered online” (p. 98). 
Christensen et al.’s (2008) projected rate of growth for the percentage of classes that will 
 35 
be delivered online can be seen in Figure 3. From this projected rate of growth, 
Christensen et al. (2008) extrapolated that “within a few years, after a long period of 
incubation, the world is likely to begin flipping rapidly to student-centric online 
technology” (p. 98). Christensen et al. (2008) believed this would happen “because of the 
technological and economic advantages of computer-based learning, compared to the 
monolithic school model” (p. 99). 
Figure 3: Projected growth of high school courses delivered online, 2000-2020 
 
Reprinted from Disrupting Class, by C. M. Christensen, M. B. Horn, & C. W. Johnson 
2008, p. 99. Copyright 2008 by Clayton M. Christensen. 
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from traditional instruction to monolithic instruction. If the disruption process was taking 
hold in the school system, Christensen et al. (2008) expected that these indicators would 
be present. First, computer-based learning would “become more enjoyable and take full 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
H
un
dr
ed
s
Percentage of high school courses delivered online
 36 
advantage of the online medium by layering in enhanced video, audio, and interactive 
elements” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 100). Second, it would be clear that disruption was 
occurring if there was evidence that it was easier for students, teachers, and parents to 
“select a learning pathway through each body of material that fits each of the types of 
learners,” or in other words, to individualize learning (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 100). 
Third, Christensen et al. (2008) anticipated that an emerging teacher shortage would 
necessitate some kind of adaptation to the current model of education, so school districts 
would need to come up with some kind of solution to address this problem (p. 100-101). 
Christensen et al. (2008) seemed to think that school districts would be inclined to use 
computer-based learning as a hedge against teacher shortages. The fourth and final factor 
that would drive substitution of computer-based learning for monolithic learning would 
be the cost savings that would be realized as the market for computer-based learning 
grew. Although producing and improving computer-based learning technologies would 
be expensive initially, as the software improved teachers would be able to supervise more 
students, becoming more like “one-on-one tutors rather than teaching monolithically” (p. 
101). Since, as time went on, teachers would be able to oversee more students at time, 
Christensen et al. (2008) thought that “the cost per student per course over the next 10 
years is likely to decline by 15 percent for each doubling of volume, so that the cost will 
be one-third of today’s costs, and the courses will be much better” because of the 
aforementioned improvements in software (p. 101). 
Altogether, Christensen et al. (2008) believed the conditions in education in 2008 
were suitable for a disruption and that the substation from teacher-led to computer-based 
instruction would proceed at a trajectory consistent with an S-curve, as long as this 
substitution is managed in keeping with the principles stemming from the theory of 
disruptive innovation (p. 102), namely seizing on opportunities of nonconsumption. Thus, 
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based on the theory of disruptive innovation and analysis of the available data regarding 
online growth in 2008, Christensen et al. (2008) made their prediction. 
Next, using information from the first section, I assess the progress that has been 
made towards Christensen et al.’s (2008) prediction that 50% of all classes would be 
delivered online in 2019. 
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Assessing the Prediction 
In this section, I explain whether or not the ways in which education has grown 
since Christensen et al. (2008) made their prediction comports with what Christensen et 
al. (2008) expected. To do so, I first describe the ways in which online learning would 
have had to grow if Christensen et al.’s (2008) prediction was going to be met. Then I 
give an account of how online learning actually grew from 2007-2015, looking for 
evidence of elements of the theory of disruptive innovation, such as nonconsumptive 
deployment of online learning at scale and a shift in the performance improvement 
metric. Finally, I give my appraisal of Christensen et al.’s (2008) prediction by 
contrasting Christensen et al.’s (2008) conjectures and what in fact transpired in the 
growth of online learning. 
EXPECTATIONS FOR GROWTH OF ONLINE LEARNING 
Christensen et al.’s (2008) bullish outlook for the rate of adoption for online 
courses was rooted in their belief in the power of properly deployed disruptive 
innovation. In Disrupting Class, Christensen et al. (2008) gave a blueprint for what 
“proper deployment” looked like in education, namely that computer-based learning 
ought to be leveraged in cases where the alternative to using a computer-based learning 
solution is nothing. Restated using Christensen et al.’s (2008) terminology, there should 
be evidence of computer-based learning in place of nonconsumption. In addition to 
evidence of nonconsumption, Christensen et al. (2008) gave two other essential 
characteristics of a disruptive innovation, namely the creation of a new measure of 
performance and the tendency for disruptive innovations to be simpler and cheaper. I do 
not address the latter of these characteristics, because characterizing the nature of the 
growth of online learning is completely subjective and because it is too difficult to 
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determine whether or not the ways in which online learning grew are in fact less 
expensive that traditional models of instruction. 
If Christensen et al.’s (2008) prediction was coming true, there should be 
evidence that computer-based learning was being used as a substitute for 
nonconsumption on an increasing basis, followed by a period of rapid expansion in the 
number of consumers of online instruction. Because of the way the data is reported, it is 
not possible to precisely know the percentage of courses in which instruction is delivered 
via the Internet. However, increases in access and enrollment of both major kinds of 
online learning programs would be indicative of the growth of overall online learning 
patterns. So, I would expect an increasing number of states to have some form of state 
virtual school and an increase in the number of students enrolled in full-time online 
courses. Christensen et al.’s (2008) argument would be substantiated if students were 
enrolling in online courses in cases where taking a traditional, in-person course was not 
possible. The level of substitution could be measured by the rate of growth in 
supplemental online courses. Also, since a shift in the political importance metric is so 
critical to the theory of disruptive innovation, I would expect that to be apparent, either 
by mandate in the form of a common federal, state, or district-level policy regarding 
online learning, or by substantial funding of online learning programs at the federal, state, 
or district level. 
HOW ONLINE LEARNING GREW FROM 2007-2015 
State virtual schools and full-time online programs were growing steadily in 2007, 
and an increasing number of students were enrolling in online courses. However, a new 
form of online learning began to show signs of growth at the district level: blended 
learning. The 2007 “Keeping Pace” report was the first “Keeping Pace” report to mention 
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blended learning. The report noted that “[t]he distinction between online and face-to-face 
[instruction] is blurring” (Watson & Ryan, 2007, p. 26). In 2009, the “Keeping Pace” 
report noted that despite limited available data, the number of district-level programs that 
“combine supplemental online courses and blended (online and face-to-face) learning 
opportunities” was growing (Watson et al., 2009, p. 7). The growth of single-district 
blended learning programs reached a tipping point in 2011: “[w]hen we look back on 
2011 from some future year, it may be clear in retrospect that 2011 was the year that 
online and blended learning went digital, transcending their distance-learning or 
computer-based instruction origins and taking root in classrooms and schools across the 
country” (Watson et al., 2011, p. 6). In 2012, the “Keeping Pace” report began to provide 
estimates about single-district options of online and blended learning, albeit in somewhat 
nebulous terms: “perhaps two-thirds of districts are offering some online or blended 
program” (Watson et al., 2012, p. 5). The 2012 “Keeping Pace” report also added 
“blended learning” to its title, reflecting the growing importance of blended learning to 
the overall landscape. The 2013 “Keeping Pace” report indicated that “an increasing 
number of districts are making online and blended options available to their students, and 
that in SY 2013-14 we believe that more than 75% of districts have some online or 
blended options” (Watson et al., 2013, p. 17). In the 2013 edition of the “Keeping Pace” 
report, Watson et al. (2013) also noted that even though most school districts were 
offering online or blended options, only a small percentage of students were actually 
enrolled in online or blended courses. The students who were enrolled were doing so to 
take recovering credit courses or to take AP or dual credit courses, in keeping with the A 
La Carte and Flex models of blended learning, respectively (Watson et al., 2013, p. 17). 
In 2014, the “Keeping Pace” report changed its title again, from “Keeping Pace 
with K–12 Online and Blended Learning” to “Keeping Pace with K–12 Digital Learning” 
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(Watson et al., 2014, p. 1). Watson et al. (2014) made this change for two reasons. First, 
the authors of the report concluded that “an ever-increasing amount of online learning 
activity developed inside individual schools and districts, as an ever-increasing number of 
students were taking online courses from within their own districts instead of from state 
virtual schools and virtual charter schools” (p. 4). This kind of online learning activity is 
representative of the A La Carte model of blended learning. Second, an increasing 
number of districts were using digital content in innovative and novels ways, by 
combining “an online or digital content component with regular face-to-face classroom 
instruction” (Watson et al., 2014, p. 4). In other words, the Rotation and Flex models of 
blended learning were being used in traditional classrooms more and more as time went 
on. According to the 2014 “Keeping Pace” report, most schools were using some form of 
digital learning, which means that by 2014, most instruction could be categorized as 
“blended” (Watson et al., 2014, p. 5). As a result, the “Keeping Pace” report elected to 
shift its focus to “identify and track student usage [of digital learning resources] across 
the entirety of K–12 education” (Watson et al., 2014, p. 5). Changing the focus of 
“Keeping Pace” was representative of a “significant evolution in the landscape,” namely 
the rise of blended learning (Watson et al., 2014, p. 4). The most recent “Keeping Pace” 
report, issued in 2015, substantiated the locus of growth in online learning from state 
virtual schools and full-time online learning programs to single-district blended 
programs: 
…the center of activity and growth has moved from state-level organizations, 
such as state virtual schools and online charter schools drawing students across 
entire states, to individual districts and schools. It has also moved from being 
mostly online to frequently combining online and onsite components. Most 
students accessing online courses or content are doing so from a physical school 
or some other formal learning center, not from home. The number of courses 
using online content in which the teacher of record is based at the physical school 
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dwarfs the number of courses in which the teacher is online. (Gemin et al., 2015, 
p. 9-10) 
Thus, from 2007 to 2015, the story of growth in online learning programs is tantamount 
to the story of growth in single-district blended learning programs employing the 
Rotation, Flex, or A La Carte models. The prevalence of blended learning is problematic 
for documentation and data collection purposes, because “if one defines blended learning 
as any combination of digital learning and face-to-face instruction, then blended learning 
implementations have infinite permutations, making it extremely difficult to identify and 
study these activities…” (Watson et al., 2014, p. 4). So, I cannot give an exact percentage 
of the number of courses that are blended relative to the overall number of courses taken 
in the United States. However, given the information found in the “Keeping Pace” 
reports, I conclude with certainty that blended learning is ubiquitous across the United 
States public school system. 
Evidence of nonconsumption and online learning 
From 2007 to 2015, there is some evidence that online learning continued to be 
used in cases of potential nonconsumption. As Christensen et al. (2008) wrote, computer-
based learning was already “gaining market share” in areas such as taking AP or other 
courses not offered at a student’s own school. Online learning was still being used for 
these purposes in 2015. The 2015 “Keeping Pace” report found that “47% of students in 
grades 9–12 pursue online learning to access courses not offered at the school” (Gemin et 
al., 2015, p. 24). In the same report, Gemin et al. (2015) analyzed several million course 
enrollments of online course providers to break down online course enrollment by subject 
area. The category “Electives and other” was the third most common area of online 
enrollment, falling in the middle of core subject areas such as language arts, math, and 
science, which supports “the anecdotal evidence that schools will often select elective 
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online courses for students that the school does not offer” (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 16). 
Smaller school districts continue to supplement their course catalogs with online courses: 
“[i]n small districts with good Internet access, online courses are often an important 
method by which the district augments the smaller number of courses offered by the 
district’s own schools” (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 30). 
Evidence of a shift in the performance improvement metric 
Christensen et al. (2008) cited four major shifts in the political importance metric 
in the history of public education in the United States, and argued that shifts in the 
political importance metric are a crucial component in the creation of a new plane of 
competition, which creates the market conditions for disruptive innovation to gain market 
share. In the previous cases Christensen et al. (2008) cited in their discussion about the 
political importance metric, there were consistently instances of federal, state, and local 
governments responding to changes in the political will by passing laws or providing 
funding to address those changes. I do not believe there is evidence of a shift in the 
political importance metric with respect to online learning. Initially, public policy had a 
great deal to do with the growth of online learning. Gemin et al. (2015) wrote that in the 
early 1990s and through 2010, “State legislatures, governors, and boards of education 
passed laws, enacted budgets, and created rules that supported online schools operating 
across entire states, funded state virtual schools, and in other ways provided for increased 
opportunities for students via support of online schools and courses (p. 104). However, 
these policies were not put in place in every state, and there are still “significant gaps in 
access to online courses” (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 104). In 2017, the United States 
Department of Education issued an update to its National Educational Technology Plan 
(NETP), which “sets a national vision and plan for learning enabled by technology 
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through building on the work of leading education researchers; district, school, and 
higher education leaders; classroom teachers; developers; entrepreneurs; and nonprofit 
organizations” (p. 3). In other words, the NETP is a good indicator of where the political 
importance metric stands. The NETP found that although “significant progress” has been 
made in terms of closing the digital divide among students who had access to the Internet 
and those who did not, there are still schools that are lagging (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2017, p. 7). Furthermore, a digital use divide remains “between learners who 
are using technology in active, creative ways to support their learning and those who 
predominantly use technology for passive content consumption” (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2017, p. 7). So, according to the NETP, there is a consensus that technology 
should be used to support learning, but there are still issues related to access to these 
resources for all students across the socioeconomic and geographic spectrums. While 
public policy is “still an important driver of digital learning,” as is clear in the NETP, 
public policy itself is “less direct now than it was in the past” towards online learning 
(Gemin et al., 2015, p. 104). The public’s attention has shifted to issues that are 
peripheral to online learning, such as Common Core standards and the reauthorization of 
the Elementary and Secondary Schools Act  (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 104-105). These 
issues affect online learning, but online learning is not the focus of such policies. In other 
words, as of 2017, there is no mandate from the public to any level of government to 
implement the kinds of policies and funding that would be indicative of a shift in the 
political importance metric with respect to online learning.  
OUTCOME OF THE PREDICTION 
In summary, while there is some evidence of using online learning in areas of 
potential nonconsumption, there has been no shift in the political importance metric in the 
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context of online learning. State virtual schools and full-time online learning programs 
remain viable computer-based learning opportunities for a small minority of students, as 
they were in 2007. However, both state virtual schools and full-time online programs 
have seen their growth slow and even in some states and cases decline, beginning around 
2011. After 2011, most of the growth in online learning shifted to single-district blended 
learning programs. In 2015, single-district blended learning is the most common 
implementation of online learning: “[t]he most prevalent use of digital content is in 
classrooms where online or local digital instructional content is used to augment courses 
that are offered on a traditional daily and semester schedule, with the teacher of record 
located on the school campus” (Gemin et al., 2015, p. 26). Christensen et al. (2008) 
predicted that by 2019, 50% of all high school classes would be delivered online. There 
are no indications that this will happen. The data regarding online learning adoption, 
specifically the number of state virtual schools and enrollments in full-time online 
programs, is not indicative of the kind of exponential growth Christensen et al. (2008) 
predicted. Moreover, the theory of disruptive innovation did not predict the pervasiveness 
of single-district blended learning programs. 
In fact, blended learning seems to be more like a sustaining innovation in the 
context of the traditional model of instruction. As I wrote, blended learning is using a 
combination of digital tools and face-to-face instruction. Online learning, a potentially 
disruptive force to the traditional model of instruction, is being used in a way that 
preserves the existing model. According to Christensen et al.’s (2008) theory of 
disruptive innovation, cramming occurs when firms take innovative ideas and use them in 
ways that “fit the interests of the groups in the company that must support the proposal in 
order for it to receive funding” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 75). Thus, blended learning 
seems to be a classic example of cramming. 
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In 2013, Christensen et al. amended the theory of disruptive innovation, 
responding in part to the growth of blended learning programs in context of online 
learning by introducing the concept of hybrid innovation, in addition to sustaining and 
disruptive innovations. A hybrid innovation is “a combination of the new, disruptive 
technology with the old technology and represents a sustaining innovation relative to the 
old technology” (Christensen et al., 2013, p. 2). Christensen et al. (2013) believed the 
newly introduced concept of hybrids accounts for the growth of blended learning 
programs, and moreover expected the shift towards blended learning to continue. 
However, in the 2013 formulation of the theory of disruptive innovation, and in contrast 
to the phrasing Christensen et al. (2008) used in Disrupting Class, Christensen et al. 
(2013) were more judicious in predicting exactly how long it may take for the disruption 
process to cycle: “the disruptive models of blended learning are…positioned to replace 
the classroom model and become the engines of change over the long term,” which might 
turn out to be “quite long” (p. 33, 35). By using more nebulous language in making their 
revised prediction, Christensen et al. (2013) seem to have recognized their previous 
mistake of making such a bold and precise prediction in the inherently complex and ever-
changing problem space of technology and the public education system. In 2008, 
Christensen et al. could not possibly have foreseen the forthcoming technological 
innovations, such as mobile devices or thin client laptops, that in part have facilitated the 
growth of blended learning programs. The ways in which technology is used in 
classrooms will change as quickly as technology changes, which is to say that change and 
innovation will continue ad infinitum. Any predictions made in such fluid conditions are 
almost certainly going to be inaccurate in some sense. 
Having said that, I believe that there is a more fundamental critique of the theory 
of disruptive innovation as it applies to the public education system in the United States. 
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In the next section, I argue that there are two reasons why Christensen et al.’s (2008) 
prediction was mistaken. 
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Why the Prediction Failed 
The theory of disruptive innovation was originally conceived in the realm of 
private sector firms. Despite this, Christensen et al. (2008) believed the theory of 
disruptive innovation still applied to other contexts. In this section, I argue that because 
of inherent features of the public education system in the United States, the theory of 
disruptive innovation should not necessarily be used as a tool for analyzing the public 
school system in the United States and using that analysis to project future outcomes. 
There are at least two reasons why the theory is not applicable in the case of the public 
education system. First the theory of disruptive innovation makes certain assumptions 
about how markets react to changing conditions. These assumptions do not apply to the 
public education system. Second, I argue that Christensen et al. (2008) underestimate the 
complexity of the public education system. 
THE K-12 SCHOOL SYSTEM IS NOT A FREE MARKET 
One problem with applying the disruptive innovation model to the public 
education system is that it was originally conceived based on evidence from the private 
sector. According to Christensen (2006), one of the underlying assumptions of the theory 
of disruptive innovations makes is that “the objective function of management should be 
to maximize shareholder value” (p. 50). Private firms maximize shareholder value by 
making the type of improvements to their products that allows them to charge higher and 
higher prices to their existing customer base (Christensen et al. 2008, p. 51). As I wrote 
previously, this is what Christensen et al. (2008) called the performance improvement 
metric. According to the theory of disruptive innovation, private firms maximize their 
shareholder value by improving their products for their existing customers by making 
sustaining innovations using the existing performance improvement metric until another 
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firm, which is also trying to maximize shareholder value, disruptively deploys a product 
to nonconsumers of previous products, creating a new performance improvement metric. 
The theory of disruption asserts that this cycle of disruption continues ad infinitum. 
Christensen et al. (2008) wrote that the analogous performance improvement 
metric for the public sector is “the political or societal importance of programs,” which I 
referred to as the political importance metric (p. 51). If the performance improvement 
metric for the private sector is equivalent to the political importance metric for the public 
sector, then the underlying assumption that managers ought to make decisions that result 
in the highest possible shareholder values is nonsensical in the context the U.S. public 
school system; there are no shareholders expecting profits, and there is no actual value to 
be earned, or profit to be gained. Students and parents do not purchase education in the 
way that consumers purchase products from firms. There is a much more intricate 
relationship between federal and state elected officials, school districts, and tax payers 
that determines how money is allocated and used in the public school system. Moreover, 
in the United States, the relationship between different levels of government is not 
analogous to the relationship between an executive and her shareholders and customers. 
State governments ultimately maintain the power to interpret and implement federal 
guidelines that are not mandated by law. For example, in 2009, the Obama administration 
created a program named “Race to the Top” (RTTT), which granted relatively more 
funds to states that, among other measures, implemented specific reforms to their teacher 
evaluation systems. From 2009 to 2015, the number of states that were in compliance 
with the guidelines related to teacher evaluation systems went from 15 to 43 as a direct 
result of RTTT (Doherty & Jacobs, 2015, p. 2). Forty-three state governments decided 
that it was best to comply with the federal guidelines and thus received more money from 
the federal government. Seven other states chose not to comply and therefore were not 
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eligible for the same funds. Making a deliberate decision to receive less overall funding is 
an irrational decision in a pure market system. However, state governments make what 
would be viewed as irrational decisions in the private sector every year for a variety of 
reasons. Thus, government entities do not respond to market forces in the way that firms 
in the private sector do. Therefore, it is uncertain that there is a useful analogy to be 
drawn between the way private sector firms and public sector entities respond to market 
forces. 
King and Baatartogtokh (2015) found the assumption that public entities act so as 
to maximize shareholder value to be “problematic” in the cases of disruption Christensen 
wrote about across his body of research that concerned nonprofit organizations or 
publicly regulated utilities (p. 82). An expert in higher education King and Baatartogtokh 
(2015) interviewed said that “the access mission of community colleges often runs 
counter to what presidents or other leaders might do to cut costs or improve completion 
outcomes” which “…makes it not such a great example for the theory because as a 
mission-driven institution, they are responsible to the public and a higher calling (p. 82). 
This critique of higher education also applies to the K-12 public education system. 
Lepore (2014) acknowledges this critique as well: 
Doctors have obligations to their patients, teachers to their students, pastors to 
their congregations, curators to the public, and journalists to their readers—
obligations that lie outside the realm of earnings, and are fundamentally different 
from the obligations that a business executive has to employees, partners, and 
investors. (para. 29) 
The incentive structures for public sector organizations are fundamentally different from 
the ones that govern the private sector, and the rules that apply in the realm of the private 
sector are not universal. This raises serious questions as to the generalizability of the 
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theory of disruptive innovation to the public sector overall, and the K-12 school system 
specifically. 
COMPLICATED VS. COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
Christensen et al. (2008) argued that while schools gave nonconsumers access to 
technology, they did not do it correctly. Instead of treating computers as a potentially 
disruptive technology, Christensen et al. (2008) contended that schools have “crammed” 
computers into their existing teaching practices: “the way schools have employed 
computers has been perfectly predictable, perfectly logical—and perfectly wrong” (p. 
73). Moreover, Christensen et al. (2008) suggested that if school administrators would 
“change course” by following the guidance found in Disrupting Class, then the problems 
of student motivation and lagging test scores that plague the U.S. school system could 
potentially be allayed and eventually resolved (p. 73). Proposing that the profound 
problems Christensen et al. (2008) are trying to fix is as simple as school administrators 
“changing course” reveals a lack of understanding of just how complex of a system 
Christensen et al. (2008) are trying to reform. 
In trying to explain why there have been so many structural changes in schools 
without commensurate reforms in teaching practices, Cuban (2013) drew a distinction 
between complicated systems and complex systems. A complicated system “assumes 
expert and rational leaders, top-down planning with a ‘mission control’ unit pursuing 
scrupulous implementation of policies in a clockwork-precise organization” (p. 156). 
Examples of complicated systems include an effort to land a rocket landing on the moon 
and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Cuban 2013, p. 155). Contrastingly, complex systems: 
…are filled with hundreds of moving parts, but many of the parts are human, and 
these players have varied expertise and independence. Moreover, missing in such 
systems is a “mission control” that runs all these different parts within ever-
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changing political, economic, and societal surroundings. The result: constant 
adaptations and compromises in design and action. (Cuban 2013, p. 156) 
Schools are an example of a complex system. There are several levels of interaction and 
interdependence. Students, parents, teachers, administrators, policy makers all interact 
with each other on classroom, school, and district levels, in addition to the “community, 
state, and national economic, political and social factors” that influence schools (Cuban 
2013, p. 159). Christensen et al. (2008) must be somewhat aware of this because they 
presented the “high level of interdependence in a classroom” as an obstacle to be 
overcome in trying to introduce more personalized learning (Christensen et al. 2008, p. 
35). Yet, in suggesting that structural reform could begin with school administrators 
“changing course,” they have made one of the oversights that Cuban (2013) claimed 
policy makers have in their attempts to legislate fundamental shifts in teaching practice. 
Specifically, Christensen et al. (2008) have mistaken public schools for complicated, not 
complex, systems in that they seem to “…see schooling as a collection of complicated 
structures that can be broken down into discrete segments and reengineered through 
algorithms and flowcharts to perfection” rather than as the “complex, dynamic, and very 
messy multilevel system” that it is (p. 163). Martone (2015) made a similar critique when 
she wrote that Christensen et al. (2008) “do not address the legislative realities involved 
when making significant educational changes” (p. 145-146). 
The confusion between complicated and complex systems is also evident in 
Christensen et al.’s (2008) account of how the U.S. school system evolved in response to 
changes in the political importance metric. Christensen et al. (2008) began the section 
of Disrupting Class that focused on the history of the public school system in the United 
States with a qualification: “[b]ecause it is a summary, we necessarily resort to 
generalizations that will mask important details and exceptions. But our aim is simply to 
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provide some general context to understand how society and schools evolved over time” 
(Christensen et al. 2008, p. 52). Nevertheless, Christensen et al.’s (2008) account 
exaggerated certain historical facts to the degree that the inferences they drew from their 
account do not follow. Christensen et al. (2008) wrote: 
In the 1890s and early 1900s, competition with a fast-rising industrial Germany 
constituted a minicrisis; Americans responded in the early twentieth century by 
handing schools a new job: prepare everyone for vocations. The goal was to 
produce a sound workforce for jobs ranging from administrative functions to 
technically demanding manufacturing positions so that America could compete 
with Germany. (p. 53) 
Then Christensen et al. (2008) gave data to confirm that schools acted in the way that 
fulfilled this job, specifically increases in school enrollments and a diversification of this 
kinds of courses schools offered (p. 54-57). So, Christensen et al. (2008) defined a 
political importance metric, in this case “the depth and breadth of courses and the 
percentages enrolling in and progressing through high school,” then gave evidence that 
schools behaved in ways that conformed to that political importance metric (p. 54). In 
fact, the impetus for the increase in high school enrollment and course offerings were 
dramatically more complex than Christensen et al. (2008) indicated. This growth did not 
happen as a reaction to a singular event, according to the very source Christensen et al. 
(2008) cited in giving their account. 
There certainly was a “rapid increase of students enrolled and graduating” during 
the 20th century, and “as the numbers of students have soared, high schools have grown 
steadily larger and more elaborate in structure and curriculum” (Tyack & Cuban 1995, p. 
47-48). But this growth is credited in part to “a number of broad societal trends—
economic, demographic, and attitudinal…” (Tyack & Cuban 1995, p. 48). Specifically, 
Tyack and Cuban (1995) mentioned the rising gross national product which helped create 
the resources necessary to build up the infrastructure for high schools to expand; 
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urbanization and the consolidation of rural districts which changed the makeup of the 
student body and required larger and more diverse high schools; a fall in birth rate which 
made it more likely that parents could afford to let their children continue to attend 
school instead of joining the labor force; at the same time, the demand for full-time 
teenaged employees fell as the government passed anti-child labor and compulsory 
school attendance laws (p. 48-49). Additionally, parents and students came to the 
realization that secondary school was necessary to secure a good job (Tyack & Cuban 
1995, p. 49). These events took place over the course of several decades. 
Tyack and Cuban (1995) do allude to the economic rivalry with Germany in the 
1890s that Christensen et al. (2008) claimed was the catalyst for a shift in the 
performance improvement metric. But Tyack and Cuban (1995) did so in the context of 
commenting on how the varied the interpretations of and responses to the expansion of 
access to education over time: “when Americans repeatedly turned to secondary 
education to solve profound economic, social, and political problems, they differed in 
their diagnoses and their solutions” (p. 49). The rivalry with Germany was part of that 
narrative, but according to Tyack and Cuban (1995) there were many other factors that 
were influencing schools in the United States during this time period. Tyack and Cuban 
(1995) showed that the number of people attending high schools and the courses high 
schools offered did not grow because of “competition with a fast-rising industrial 
Germany,” so it does not necessarily follow that “Americans responded by handing 
schools a new job” (Christensen et al. 2008, p. 53). This calls into question the implied 
causal relationship between changes in the political importance metric and the reasons 
why schools evolved in the various ways that they have over time. 
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Conclusion 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) maintained that the theory of disruption is 
predictive: “[d]isruption is a theory: a conceptual model of cause and effect that makes it 
possible to better predict the outcomes of competitive battles in different circumstances” 
(p. 55). In a separate article, Christensen (2006) argued that the predictive power of the 
theory is a criterion on which the validity of the theory should be judged and that “any 
assertion that the model has not or cannot be used to predict outcomes simply does not 
square with historical fact” (p. 42, 46) 
In the case of the public education system in the United States, I found that the 
theory of disruptive innovation failed to predict the ways in which online learning would 
affect instruction from 2007 to 2015. Furthermore, I argued that the theory of disruptive 
innovation may not be applicable to the public education system in the United States at 
all, because the theory does not account for differences between the public and private 
markets, and because the public education system in the United States is much more 
complex than Christensen et al. (2008) portray. 
Despite that, I regard Christensen’s (2006) standard for judging the usefulness of 
his theory by the degree to which it is predictive as too high of a threshold. Even though 
the theory of disruptive innovation was not predictive in this particular case, the theory 
can still prove useful to educators who are trying to improve their schools or districts, 
especially when a new innovation is introduced. Gobble (2015) argued that the theory of 
disruption is best used as an instrument of analysis: 
Disruptive innovation…is a useful framework for strategy that innovators, 
entrepreneurs, and managers can use to understand the market, identify potential 
threats and opportunities, and plot a way forward. It is not the only way to win, 
and it doesn’t always apply. But properly understood and thoughtfully applied, it 
is neither more nor less than a powerful tool (p. 61) 
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The theory of disruptive innovation, then, does not foretell the future, and it does not 
adequately describe the past. Rather, its best use for educators is as a framework for 
thinking about the means by which they educate, and how innovations could be used in 
the service of improving education. For example, a school principal could reimagine how 
their school might operate if the school was in a private sector market, competing with 
other schools. Following some kind of instructional innovation, the principal could assess 
whether the school could serve the existing “market” using that innovation and perhaps 
come up with changes she could make to achieve the most optimal outcomes for her 
“customers” or students using this new innovation. Furthermore, the principal could 
identify opportunities to address students whose needs are not currently being met or 
accounted for in the existing “market,” and use the new innovation to reach such 
students. Forcing educators to question their assumptions about how their students’ needs 
are being met could lead to a better overall educational experience for more students. 
Reducing the scope of the theory of disruptive innovation to a single classroom for an 
individual teacher in a specific learning context could prove to be a more effective usage 
of the theory. For example, when evaluating whether or not to implement a specific 
technology in a classroom, a teacher could ask herself, in keeping with the notion of 
nonconsumption, “does this tool address needs that are not currently being met in my 
classroom?” Moreover, applying the political importance metric to a classroom context, a 
teacher could ask herself, “does the learning situation require this specific technology?” 
Applying the theory of disruption on a smaller scale could be way to discern how useful a 
potential innovation might be. As Meyer (2011) observed, “[i]t isn’t the technology per 
se, but the new thinking it inspires, that can be disruptive” (p. 45). It is not possible to 
know what new innovations the future holds for all classrooms across the United States, 
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but perhaps the theory of disruptive innovation could be informative for assessing 
educational innovations one classroom at a time. 
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